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FEMINIST RECLAIMING OF THE POPULAR:  






The present paper is a contribution to feminist research in cultural studies that 
contests the allegedly incompatible relationship between entertainment and state 
politics,  challenging  the  unproductive  denunciation  of  the  coupling  of  politics  with  
popular  culture.  My  argument  is  based  on  the  comparative  analysis  of  two  recent  
examples  of  the  political  media’s  attempts  at  gate-keeping  intended  to  discredit  
woman  politicians  in  Hungary  and  the  US,  trying  to  ‘put  them  in  their  place’.  The  
two  cases  are  the  coalition  building  by  the  so-called  white-capped  woman  MPs  
representing all  opposition parties  in  parliament against  the ‘slave law’  in  Hungary 
and the response to the six presidential candidates of the Democrats for the 2020 US 
elections.  I will conceptualize the two allegedly distinct fields of politics and popular 
culture as intersecting by pointing out a shared logic of spectacular communication 
at  work  in  both  as  defined  by  Guy  Debord  (2006).  In  terms  of  methodology,  I  will  
argue  that  a  comparative  analysis  in  search  of  an  overlap  both  between  popular  
culture and elite politics and between the two societies entails a dialectical, dynamic 
approach  to  comparison.  A  comparative  study  is  inherently  multi-directional  and  
cannot fix one of the social fields or societies as ‘the’ point of departure for the analysis. 
That fixation would make the selected element function into the ‘obvious’ measure, 
inevitably  othering the one compared to  it.  A  dynamic,  multi-directional  approach 
to  comparison  can  be  best  accounted  for  as  a  relationship  of  intersectionality  
enmeshed in diverse global cycles of communication.
1 Introduction
In  my  paper  I  want  to  contest  the  perceived  binary  divide  between  state  
politics and popular culture and challenge the denunciation of the latter produced 
by  the  logic  of  such  a  practice  of  categorization.  Instead  I  will  argue  for  a  relative  
distinction of the two by pointing out that party politics and popular culture share the 
spectacular logic of communication of commodity culture. An important constituent 
element  of  that  political  communication  is  the  prevailing  practice  of  discrediting  
woman politicians when they are seen to be potentially successful in their progressive 
critique of the system both in Hungary and the US. The discrediting is performed by 
various associations rendered to belong in popular culture since it is regularly seen as 
a domain of ‘femininity’. The exclusionary gender politics will be demonstrated by the 
right-wing media’s hostile response to the ‘white-capped women’s’  demonstration 
against the so-called ‘slave law’ introduced in December 2018 in Hungary and to that 
of  Elizabeth  Warren’s  presidential  candidacy  in  the  USA.  Although  the  institutional  
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organizations  of  gender  and  gender  politics  in  the  two  societies  are  not  a  simple  
matter  of  equivalence,  nor  do  the  regulatory  practices  in  the  two  geographical  
spaces constitute identical discourses of normalcy, I still believe that a comparative 
analysis  is  methodologically  valid  and  can  contribute  to  an  understanding  of  the  
gate-keeping mechanisms of the media in both spaces in their own distinctive ways. 
In  spite  of  the  differences  of  the  distribution  of  the  meaning-making  practices  in  
the two social  spaces,  the radical  multiplicity of  the political  field of  the 2010s may 
still support the explanatory power of a transformative use of Rosemary Hennessy’s 
(1995) conceptualization of gender and the regulation of its visibility, as discussed in 
Section 2 below.
2 Intersectionality and comparison
Methodologically  speaking,  my  analysis  entails  a  dialectical,  dynamic  
approach  to  doing  a  comparative  study.  It  entails  above  all  a  comparison  that  
does not fix the analytical point of departure, in this case a priori in the US cultural 
and  political  space.  That  decision  would  inevitably  turn  the  specificities  of  the  
US  into  ‘the’  ideal  measure,  attributing  to  it  a  necessarily  more  advanced,  more  
democratic formation – retroactively ‘proving’ the a priori values implicated in the 
researcher’s decision. A dynamic approach to comparison rather assumes partial 
similarities between the two societies and in turn a complexity of the attempts at 
minimizing the relevance of the emergence of women politicians in elite politics in 
both countries.  What I  am interested in is to trace the ideological attempts of the 
media at rearticulating these women’s left-leaning progressive policies as an act of 
credibility because ‘they are caring for the future of their children.’ The intersectional 
approach to social conflicts allows me to reveal that the discreditation is not merely 
a matter of culture (care in association with mothering) but also a political struggle 
over participation on an equal footing. This way the very measures of comparison 
come to be internally diverse and relative to the specificities of the given society, 
successfully disrupting and exposing the semiotic horizon of ‘care’ in contemporary 
(US  as  well  as  Hungarian)  consumer  society  in  a  way  where  social  power  in  
delineating gender difference is no longer the power of domination but “the source 
of  political  empowerment  and  social  reconstruction”  as  argued  by  Kimberlé  
Crenshaw (1994, p.93).  At the same time, due to the intersection of multiple power 
relations, the change in the point of departure for comparison will not end up in an 
absolutist valorization of plurality either, precluding any comparison on the grounds 
of  incomparable  local  specificities.  The  comparison  will  result  in  the  possibility  of  
exposing shared global tendencies traversing the various formations of commodity 
culture  in  the two countries  and will  show that  matters  of  various social  conflicts  
equally tend to be ‘dressed up’ as matters of presentation and appearance in the 
eye  of  the  citizenry,  while  diverting  the  imaginary  spectator’s  gaze  from  a  more  
substantial structural critique of the event in question. 
My analysis will  demonstrate that what the two spaces have in common – in 
the name of  credibility  – is  the strategic appropriation of  femininity as a matter of  
popular cultural entertainment of fashion or (motherly) care safely contained under 
the  sign  of  Guy  Debord’s  (1994/2006)  concept  of  the  ‘spectacle’.  According  to  him,  
social  lives  are  ruled  by  commodity  relations,  even  if  to  different  degrees  where  
imaginary  “[woman  politicians’]  life  presents  itself  as  an  immense  [self-evident]  
accumulation of spectacles” (Debord, 2006, p.12). Therefore, it is very difficult to argue 
for  an  alternative  gender  politics  that  should  challenge  the  normalizing  account  
of  commodification.  However,  through  deconstructing  the  alleged  divide  between  
politics  and  popular  culture  we  may  provide  a  social  account  of  gender  identities  
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that are not to be seen as a matter of individual choice of ‘lifestyle’ on display but of 
a historically contingent social position under the conditions of commodity culture to 
be challenged by addressing structural (institutionalized) ways of living. 
The value of an intersectional comparative analysis is therefore twofold. Firstly, it 
lies in its potential to engage the very concept of difference in a political frame rather 
than suppressing or amplifying it within normalized hierarchies of consumerist ‘style’. 
Secondly, this engagement does not necessarily result in a wholesale discreditation 
of  identity  either.  Insofar  as  our  political  objective  is  to  “imagine  […]  a  liberal  polity  
whose price of  inclusion [of  gender difference] does not demand erasure through 
assimilation,” as Linda Martin Alcoff (2006, p.84) puts it succinctly, we cannot disregard 
but need to understand the function of identity in the particular power struggles. In 
commodity  culture,  where  identity  comes  to  be  “visibly  marked  on  the  body  itself,  
guiding if not determining the way we perceive and judge others and are perceived 
and judged by them” (Alcoff, 2006, p.5), we cannot simply embrace a post-modernist 
disregard  of  identity  as  an  inherently  injurious  because  arbitrary  act.  Instead,  she  
proposes  a  move  that  subverts  the  binary  opposition  informing  the  most  recent  
debate on the usefulness of identity politics. She argues for the need to expose the 
foundational logic of a self-evidently understood visibility and explore in its stead its 
situatedness along diverse vectors of power, so being able to acknowledge the role 
identities play in power struggles. 
Following from Alcoff’s and Crenshaw’s observation, this re/articulation of identity 
in contemporary commodity culture involves then, I argue, the redefinition of the very 
meaning of visibility, the act of seeing itself. This consists in shifting the concept from 
self-evident  experiential  matter  of  appearance  to  materialized  embodiment  at  the  
intersection  of  discourses  and  institutions.  Drawing  on  Rosemary  Hennessy’s  (1995,  
p.143) argumentation, ‘visible’ is what is an ideologically desirable cultural object to be 
routinely ‘registered’ as self-contained simple matter of display, while ‘seeable’ entails a 
critical exposure of the historical conditions of visibility including economic divisions of 
labor and wealth, political arrangements of state and politics fetishized by the glamour 
of the spectacle. An intersectional approach to comparison then means that we see 
the cultural/semiotic practices of meaning-making of ‘woman’ and the social, material 
(economic and political) practices of institutional organization of those meanings and 
activities associated with it in a dialectic relation, where the knowledge claims about 
what  ‘woman(hood)’  should  or  could  mean  in  association  with  the  various  cultural  
products  are  themselves  interventions  in  what  we  come  to  know  ‘about’  woman  
collectives and, reversely, will shape our social/material arrangements of such positions. 
In  other  words,  Hennessy  (1995)  argues  that  gender  distinction  is  a  social  
institution  of  categorization  and  one  that  is  not  the  only  domain  that  organizes  
and  articulates  the  meanings  of  femininity  (and  masculinity):  those  meanings  
are  articulated  and  organized  in  other  domains  such  as  party-political  election  
campaigns and oppositional protests in my data, which events are themselves at the 
same time implicated as divisions of labor. Nor do femininity/masculinity distinctions 
only organize and articulate gender,  but they may also produce implied meanings 
through a chain of associations, such as that of the ‘political leader’ or ‘electability’.  
Making  the  implied,  i.e.  directly  invisible  meanings  seeable  by  deconstructing  the  
explicit, i.e., the apparently self-evident visible meanings of the ‘(real) woman politician’ 
in the two political arenas and comparing their shared logic of (re)presentation may 
result  in  a  feminist  political  subversion.  This  radical  strategy  challenges  a  short-
sighted  descriptive  approach  to  analysis  that  ultimately  reiterates  the  dominant  
ideology  and  feeds  into  “commodity’s  gravitation  towards  the  new,  the  exotic,  the  
spectacular” (Hennessy,  1995,  p.161).  In other words,  such a political action takes the 
visibility of commodity logic at face value instead of exposing the structural effects of 
its production, and allowing for empowerment. 
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I  hope  that  my  understanding  of  Hennessy’s  differentiation  of  immediate  
display from the implied logic of visibility will support my intersectional approach to 
a comparative analysis, namely the need to expose the implied structuration of the 
multiple dimensions of the field of study, in my case that of party politics, that is played 
out explicitly in an allegedly immediate, visible manner in the field of popular cultural 
statements of fashion and appeal. The application of Hennessy’s approach is twofold. 
On the one hand, it allows me to establish the nexus of multiple meanings, the dynamic 
play of said/unsaid statements without which no signifier may come to be intelligible 
in  a  given  historical  moment  and  cultural  space.  Secondly,  it  also  opens  up  some  
space for a potential shift in the meaning of woman towards radical (identity) politics 
and away from the dominant lifestyle (identity) spectacle of commodity culture. 
Although such a historical  materialist  intersectional  approach to  comparison 
would entail a systematic analysis of the institutional as well as the semiotic conditions 
of enunciation in contemporary Hungarian and US elite politics, my analysis, for lack of 
space, will focus predominantly on the semiotic dimension. I will expose the dominant 
logic  of  categorization  practices  informing the diverse  meanings  of  woman(hood)  
at  the  intersection  of  the  contemporary  hegemonic  formation  of  ruling  and  
appearance through the perspective of ‘spectacle’.  This is  a legitimate objective in 
so far as identities can be viewed as categories of knowledge that are rendered into 
meaningful orders of values as effects of dominant logics of institutionalized power, 
legitimizing what is meaningful and what is not or is less so at the given moment of 
political struggle for power.
3 Exposing the gender bias in discrediting woman politicians
Liesbet  van  Zoonen  (2004)  in  developing  the  concept  of  cultural  citizenship  
challenges the alleged absolute difference between politics and popular culture by 
pointing  out  their  shared  use  of  “the  intense  investments  that  audiences  make  in  
their favorite popular genres and stars” and its bearings “on the possible activity and 
involvement of people in the political field” (van Zoonen, 2004, p.53).  Her approach 
contests  the  dominant  binary  perception  of  members  of  fandom  enacting  an  
affective  appreciation/consumption  of  cultural  objects  of  entertainment  against  
a  critical  cognitive  and  active  assessment  of  events  and  objects  associated  with  
the  political  activities  characteristic  of  responsible  citizens.  “Juxtaposing  fans  and  
citizens in such commonsensical terms suggests that fandom cannot be a beneficial 
model for political citizenship; on the contrary, the passive fan and the active citizen 
are constructed as absolute opposites” (van Zoonen, 2004, p.61). Going beyond this 
hierarchical distinction of the two social fields prevailing in contemporary political 
discourse,  for  instance  in  the  regular  charging  one’s  opponents  (or  enemy)  with  
‘soaping’ politics, van Zoonen introduces the concept of ‘entertaining citizenship’ at 
the intersection of the popular cultural and political in so far as both are shown to 
“rest on emotional investments that are intrinsically linked to rationality and lead to 
‘affective intelligence’” (van Zoonen, 2004, p.53).  Although she does not refer to the 
earlier  work  by  Paolo  Carpignano,  Robin  Andresen,  Stanley  Aronowitz,  and  William  
DiFazio  (1993),  it  is  important  to  mention  their  discussion  of  the  recent  crisis  of  
legitimacy  in  news  media  communication.  Their  major  claim  is  that  the  response  
consists in the emergence of the ideology of the phantom public produced by the 
immediacy  and  the  ‘nowness’  of  the  communicative  practice  of  television  news  
(Carpignano  et  al.,  1993,  p.103),  resulting  in  the  effect  of  an  ‘unmediated’,  direct  
relationship with reality between the events and the journalists and, in turn, between 
the media and the viewer. Carpignano et al. also point out that the divide serves to 
mitigate or play down the relevance of two major changes in news reporting, both 
making use of the structural specificity of the soap opera narrative where “The news 
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room becomes the location of happening and the reporting of the events becomes 
the plot of the situation (the difference between ‘Murphy Brown’ and ‘Eyewitness News’ 
might be only in the intensity of laughter)” (Carpignano et al., 1993, p.105). Carpignano 
et  al.  read  this  attempt  at  “counteracting  the  crisis  of  legitimacy  of  the  news”  by  
various structural tools of ‘proximity’, epitomized by the construction of the figure of 
the ‘star investigative reporter’ as unequivocally negative. Their perception of news 
(production) is set up against and over ‘entertainment’, such as ‘soap operas’, as the 
realm of the imaginary. I think it is an inevitable move since Carpignano et. al ignore 
the fact that the binary distinction is at the same time reinforced by the association 
of  entertainment  (and  affect)  with  ‘femininity’  and  the  ‘rationality’  of  the  former  
with ‘masculinity’.  Note, nevertheless, the collocation of stardom and investigation, 
which resembles that of van Zoonen’s ‘entertaining citizenship’, opening up to a less 
judgmental and potentially more subversive reading of the changes. Making explicit 
the importance of  the gendered and gendering dimension of  this  reconfiguration 
of  the  public/private  binary  where  what  is  at  stake  is  the  legitimacy  of  the  ‘news’  
embodied in the ‘investigative’ relationship of the journalist over (and at the expense 
of)  the  tabloid  media  worker.  What  is  more,  in  so  far  as  the  media  is  the  fourth  
estate of power, the concern over the media falling prey to popular culture is also 
present in the domain of  governance,  the other estate of  power,  whose practices 
of  ‘soaping’  are  the  immediate  focus  of  van  Zoonen’s  analysis.  She  is  giving  an  
account of the ways in which the location of woman politicians at the intersection 
of public policy-making and gender makes their actual experience of discreditation 
qualitatively  different  from  that  of  man  politicians.  To  advance  the  telling  of  that  
location she draws on an intersectional approach to the structural intersection of 
the public domain of  elite politics.  The selective choice of  certain popular cultural  
technologies  of  communication  is  explained  as  being  governed  by  commodity  
culture’s orientation towards appearance,  but in such a way that it  should secure 
the ‘credibility’ of the man politician, leaving his entitlement to the embodiment of 
the  figure  of  the  ‘leader’  unquestioned,  functioning  as  the  ideological  limit  to  the  
appropriation of the popular by the political.  
Celia  Lury’s  (1996)  reading  of  late  modern  commodity  culture  explains  this  
ever-growing  dominance  of  the  spectacle.  Her  major  point  is  that  since  the  late  
1970s  there  have  emerged  multiple  and  relatively  independent  cycles  and  sites  
for  the  production  and  consumption  of  things,  each  with  their  relatively  distinct  
regimes of value.  This is  another way of saying that the importance of the market 
for the circulation of things produced or appropriated for exchange has immensely 
expanded.  The  relative  independence  of  production  and  consumption  resulted  in  
growing (buying) power and authority being granted to certain groups of consumers, 
resulting  in  “[t]he  special  importance  given  to  the  consumption  or  use  of  cultural  
objects  or  goods  in  contemporary  societies  by  specific  social  groups  or  cultural  
intermediaries” (Lury, 1996, p.4). I would argue that the greater the gap between the 
cycles of  production and consumption,  that  is  the greater  the divide between the 
exploitative and ‘ugly’ nature of capitalist production and the appealing packaging 
and promotion of  the commodities,  the more likely  it  is  for  the commodities to be 
able  to  be  decontextualized  and  reoriented  towards  ‘luminosity’  or  ‘looking  good’,  
which is captured by Debord’s concept of the ‘spectacle’. What is interesting to trace, 
then, are the ways in which this ‘looking good’, and with it the dominance of the art-
culture field, crosscuts with gender relations. Why is this orientation to appearance 
and design (symbolic value) not seen as ‘feminine’ when it is associated with man 
politicians and their programs? Why does the use of emotionally charged images, 
when  associated  with  female  embodiments,  work  in  more  demanding  ways  to  
disarticulate their political messages from the spectacle and present themselves as 
‘authentic’ politicians of substance and trust in the eye of the citizenry? These are the 
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ultimate questions guiding my analysis of the chosen press materials to see how this 
explicitly unacknowledged, yet indispensable work of gender plays out and emerges 
at moments when woman politicians appropriate the center stage in large numbers 
both in Hungary and the US. 
I  have  chosen  two  similar  moments  from  recent  party-political  struggles  in  
the  two  countries.  Both  have  to  do  with  the  potential  power  of  women  politicians  
when caught performing a kind of solidarity across their differences, hoping to make 
themselves visible on their own terms and have their voice heard. The Hungarian event 
is the protest against the so-called “slave law” which was passed by the governing 
FIDESZ (Young Democrats’ Association) majority in Parliament on December 12, 2018. 
The law entails several amendments to the Hungarian labor code: it raises the cap 
on  overtime  from  250  to  400  hours  a  year,  and  gives  employers  up  to  three  years  
instead of one to pay for the work.1 The US event is the unprecedented number of six 
woman  candidates  running  in  the  2020  pre-elections  in  the  Democratic  Party.  The  
potential point of similarity between the two cases is captured by the question: what 
happens when ‘gender’  cannot be taken as an obviously given category of female 
sameness with a single token woman at play. The exceptionally high number of six 
candidates in the US and the thirteen MPs in Hungary coming from various opposition 
party factions inside and outside of Parliament successfully building a block around 
the particular issue calls for the recognition of internal differentiation within women; 
the actual political situation calls for an intersectional approach.
The  Hungarian  opposition  has  been  extensively  criticized  for  its  inability  to  
form a coalition against the FIDESZ-KDNP (Young Democrats’ Association - Christian 
Democratic  Party)  coalition  in  the  last  elections  in  April  2018,  allowing  FIDESZ  to  
form  a  two-thirds  majority  government  for  the  third  time  in  succession  instead  
of  a simple majority.  They have been accused of  letting down the majority of  the 
citizenry (52%),  who voted for  the opposition but whose votes were lost  within the 
framework  of  the  new  electoral  law  passed  in  2012,  whose  logic  can  be  defied  if  
and only if  there is  only  one candidate of  the opposition running against  the one 
in  power2  (Bíró-Nagy,  2018).  Against  this  history  of  division  and  rivalry,  it  was  an  
unprecedentedly  promising  moment  when  the  opposition  parties,  both  the  right  
and left wing factions, for the first time, eventually united against the ‘slave law’ on 
the day of the vote in Parliament, trying to obstruct the vote and then organizing a 
demonstration the next day. The protest march was to make the newly forged union 
visible for the public. Therefore, it is important to highlight that it was decided that this 
union should be symbolized by thirteen women, representing the different parties in 
opposition, literally leading the march – wearing white caps and shawls. The dress 
code was intended to be symbolic, to invite the citizens to see them as leaders of 
a ‘peaceful’, non-violent demonstration. Yet, very quickly, it was associated with the 
color of the suffragette’s movement as well. 
Regarding the reception of the event, I analyze three quotes. The first one is by 
the ex-Prime Minister in the first  center-right government after the system change 
in  1989,  Péter  Boross.  He  was  interviewed  about  his  opinion  of  the  current  political  
situation  in  the  first  issue  of  Magyar  Nemzet  (Hungarian  Nation),  the  right-wing  
broadsheet in February 2019, when it was relaunched under new ownership after the 
parliamentary  elections  in  2018.  He took  the symbolic  opportunity  of  the ‘restart’  to  
express the following reflections on the opposition in February 2019. Considering his 
position in elite politics, his opinion was taken to stand for the establishment’s view:
1 The  full  text  of  the  bill  in  Hungarian  is  available  at  https://www.parlament.hu/
irom41/03628/03628.pdf.
2 For  information  on  the  processing  of  the  people’s  vote  into  actual  number  of  
representatives,  see  the  entry  on  the  voting  system  after  2012  at  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Elections_in_Hungary.
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With Western money, they want to tear down even the traditional gender roles. 
For instance, no matter how degenerated the political fights have been, or how 
shallow the discourse, these gross things were at least not linked with women. 
The casting of such vulgar roles involved men, who did meet the requirements 
of roughness. Now, however, women politicians take the lead in primitivity, in low 
class performances. That’s what we could see in the scandal in the parliament 
or  in  the  affray  outside  the  headquarters  of  MTVA  (‘Hungarian  Broadcasting  
Corporation’).3 (Megyeri, 2019)
In response to Mr. Boross’s interview, eight MPs, all men, representing all parties 
in  opposition  in  Parliament,  issued  a  Letter  of  Protest  in  support  of  their  woman  
colleagues under the title “It is Péter Boross who is a disgrace” on the same day. It was 
an important gesture to reinforce the new coalition-building of the opposition, yet in 
terms of gender relations, their logic is contradictory. On the one hand, they (rightly) 
criticize  the  ex-prime  minister  for  his  silence  when  MPs  are  accused  of  physical  
violence against their wives or for his idea of imposing a tax on single women and for 
contending that the most appropriate place for women is the maternity ward:
Péter  Boross  has  no words  to  protest  when a  politician from the government  
faction  breaks  his  wife’s  nose  and  jaw,  but  calls  woman  politicians  primitive  
when they stand up for the voters with reason. Péter Boross himself has taken 
the lead in arguing that a new tax on single women should be imposed and the 
only place where a woman cannot be replaced is the maternity ward.4 (Boross 
Péter maga a gyalázat, 2019 Feb 6)
Nevertheless,  in the Letter of Protest the eight signatories see the woman MPs 
fight for gender specific ‘issues’  as if  there were a gendered division of labor in the 
representation of the constituency:
The woman MPs in the opposition have stood up for the elimination of violence 
against women and children, the ratification of the Istanbul Convention [Action 
against  Violence  against  Women  and  Domestic  Violence,  2011],  and  for  the  
implementation  of  the  Lanzarote  Convention  in  Hungary  [Council  of  Europe  
Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual 
Abuse, 2007].5 (Boross Péter maga a gyalázat, 2019 Feb 6)
The  binary  divide  of  sexual  difference  is  further  underscored  in  the  closing  
statement - with an appeal to the ‘real man’, by implication of the signatories of the 
protest,  who  should  feel  ashamed  if  anyone  speaks  about  women  in  the  voice  of  
3  All  translations  of  the  Hungarian  print  media  texts  are  provided  by  the  Author.  In  the  
Hungarian original: “Nyugati pénzzel a háttérből le akarják bontani még a hagyományos 
társadalmi  szerepeket  is.  Például  eddig  bármilyen  elfajultak  is  voltak  a  politikai  csatározások,  
sekélyes a beszédmód, de mégsem a nőkhöz kötődtek ezek az ordenáréságok. A férfiakra osztották 
az alantasabb szerepeket, akik meg is feleltek ezeknek a durvasági elvárásoknak. Most ellenben 
a női politikusok viszik a prímet a primitívségben, a színvonal alatti akciók terén. Ezt láthattuk az 
országházi botrányokozás vagy az MTVA-székházban való garázdálkodás alkalmával is.”
4 In the Hungarian original: “Boross Péternek egyetlen szava sincs, amikor egy kormánypárti 
politikus eltöri felesége orr- és járomcsontját, de primitívnek nevezi a női képviselőket, ha 
jogosan  kiállnak  a  választókért.  Boross  Péter  személyesen  is  élen  járt  afféle  kijelentések  
megfogalmazásában, mint hogy szingli adót kellene bevezetni, vagy hogy a nő egy helyen nem 
helyettesíthető: a szülőszobában.”
5  In the Hungarian original:  “Az ellenzék női képviselői kiálltak a nők és a gyermekek elleni 
erőszak visszaszorításáért, az Isztambuli Egyezmény ratifikációjáért, és azért, hogy a Lanzarote-i 
Egyezményt végrehajtsa Magyarország.”
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‘disrespect’. This traditional perception of a man / woman relationship as ‘respectful’ 
simply  cannot  be  undermined  by  the  very  intention  of  standing  up  for  equality  
between women and men MPs:
Hungarian society  needs strong women in  the opposition as  well.  A  real  man 
never speaks like that about women. After an interview like this,  everyone has 
good reason to feel ashamed on behalf of the ex-prime minister.6 (Boross Péter 
maga a gyalázat, 2019 Feb 6)
At  the  same  time,  the  most  vocal  critical  voices  from  the  site  of  grassroots  
activism,  self-identifying  as  ardent  opponents  of  the  populist  political  system,  
reflected on the event from the most misogynist  perspective,  degrading the event 
for its marketing:
The  white  cap  and  the  white  shawl  were  so  effective  that  no  one  else  was  
wearing  them;  only  politicians.  The  Western  press  was  enthusiastically  
celebrating the heroes and symbols of the ‘resistance’ against Viktor Orbán’s 
macho authoritarian power: the woman MPs wearing white caps and shawls.
A priority role was given to symbols to which people could march: in addition 
to  the  eternal  symbol,  the  Parliament,  the  headquarters  of  MTVA,  the  empty 
space of the Imre Nagy Statue, and the Presidential Residence in the Sandor 
Palace and Orbán Victor’s luxury office in the convent of the Carmelites [in the 
Castle District]. 
We have no option left but to dismiss and pension off those responsible for the 
two-thirds majority [in parliament], the privileged over the past thirty years; to 
change the elite: to set up a new party system.7 (Puzsér, 2019).
My key point is that the fairly widespread sarcastic tone exemplified in the quote 
above is mediated by misogyny. The profound disappointment with politics since the 
system change in general, and with the opposition in particular, is criticized not as a 
matter of institutional organization of power but as one of the generational incapacity 
of  particular  individuals,  which is  captured by the image of  the opposition woman 
MPs, ironically, at a moment when they are at long last providing a good example for 
their  male  colleagues  in  the  opposition  to  follow:  uniting  their  forces  over  individual  
contentious  party  political  gains.  The  sarcastic  voice  of  overgeneralization,  using  
women’s faces to stand in for the political structure, is particularly unfair in a country 
that has the lowest share of woman politicians in the European Union.8 What is more, 
the scapegoating of women is legitimized by accusing them of turning politics into 
a  ‘stupid  fashion  statement’  instead  of,  presumably,  dealing  with  ‘real  problems  
of  substance’.  Although  marketization  is  integral  to  structuring  global  capitalist  
production, one major institution of it is the fashion industry. The demands of the profit 
6 In the Hungarian original: “A magyar társadalomnak szüksége van erős nőkre az ellenzék 
sorain belül is. Egy igazi férfi soha nem beszél így a nőkről. Egy ilyen interjú után jó oka van 
mindenkinek arra, hogy a volt miniszterelnök helyett is elszégyellje magát.”
7  In  the  Hungarian  original:  “A fehér sapka és a fehér sál annyira jól működött, hogy 
politikusokon kívül más nem is viselte. A nyugati sajtó lelkesen ünnepelte az Orbán Viktor macsó 
tekintélyuralmával szemben kibontakozó „ellenállás” hőseit és jelképeit: a fehér sapkás, fehér sálas 
képviselőnőket. Kitüntetett szerepet kaptak azok a jelképek, amelyekhez vonulni lehetett: az örökös 
szimbólum, a Parlament mellett az MTVA székháza, Nagy Imre szobrának hűlt helye, a köztársasági 
elnök hivatala a Sándor-palotában és Orbán Viktor luxus-dolgozószobája a Karmelita kolostorban. 
Nincs más, mint a kétharmad felelőseinek, az elmúlt harminc év haszonélvezőinek a nyugdíjazása, 
nincs más, mint az elitcsere: egy új pártstruktúra felállítása.”
8 For the exact figures see the appropriate European Union document on women in politics 
in the EU: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes.
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through ‘fashion’ not only targets particular groups of the population but “facilitates 
the building up of multiple social groups who define themselves through the assertion 
of  a specific  style”  where the multiple  goods externalize diverse personalities  (Lury,  
1996, p.48). However, as an effect of the sexist ideological perception of marketization, 
men emerge as the chief  bearers of  ‘production’  as if  beyond and above the logic 
of  ‘consumption’,  which  is  made  to  look  frivolous  and  as  such  dangerous  only  for  
women, who allegedly cannot resist its temptation. It is the ideological implication of 
gender distinction that saves the exploitative classist logic of the capital in place as 
well as the relatively autonomous space of state politics serving that interest at the 
expense of  womanhood.   In  short,  the politicians wearing the white hat  and shawl,  
once exposed to  the scrutiny  of  the male  journalist,  are  revealed and represented 
not as self-possessed autonomous decision makers but as individuals possessed by 
commodity aesthetics – consumed, of course, by the gaze of men. 
4. Gendering likeability
The  stakes  for  women  politicians  in  the  US  are  similar:  to  be  recognized  as  
autonomous active agents; yet their struggles are played out in a relatively different 
political  space.  The ultimate test  of  their  success is  the presidential  election.  In  the 
history of presidential campaigns, there have been altogether five women candidates, 
and each time only one woman competing with dozens of male candidates in the 
pre-elections.  The  2020  competition  is  an  historic  break  with  that  tradition.  The  six  
women candidates running in the presidential pre-elections are all Democrats. Their 
record  is  coupled  with  an  equally  unprecedentedly  large  number  of  women,  102  
altogether,  elected  to  the  House  of  Representatives  in  2018,  of  whom  35  are  newly  
elected, according to the Pew Research Center (Desilver, 2018). 
Breaking with the tendency which lasted until the early 1990s, the record number 
of women serving in the new Congress and the six women on the presidential-debate 
stages  is  a  major  visible  change  in  comparison  with  the  2008  and  2016  elections,  
when Hillary Clinton was the only woman against a dozen male candidates running 
in  the  Democratic  Primaries.  The  current  media  presentation  therefore  calls  for  a  
comparison  with  the  reception  of  Hillary  Clinton’s  first  presidential  campaign  in  
the  2008  elections.  Clinton’s  reception  in  the  press  back  then  can  be  read  as  an  
indirect act of homophobia that was part of a backlash against queer and feminist 
politics,  within  the  hostile  frames  of  an  intelligibility  that  positions  woman  and  
political leadership as a highly contentious collocation. In my comparative study of 
that reception, I argued that it was a backlash against feminism overtly played out 
around the looks of Hillary Clinton, who was singled out for her ‘obsession with the 
pantsuit’.  It  was read as her conservative ‘failure’  to accomplish the ‘post-feminist’  
balance  between  looking  properly  feminine,  i.e.,  ‘sexy  enough’  without  overdoing  
the masculine (Barát, 2011).  The research question I am pursuing now is concerned 
therefore  with  whether  the  exceptionally  high  number  of  women  and  their  ethnic  
diversity  in  the  Democratic  Primary  may  make  a  difference  to  the  earlier  gender  
politics of 2008, whether they can subvert the gendered politics of professionalism 
optimized in the concern about ‘dressing for success’ in Hillary Clinton’s case. If  so, 
in what other ways does gender bias play a role in the voters’ perception and is that 
bias still mediated by popular culture?
At the time of writing this analysis the strongest candidate of the six is Senator 
Elizabeth  Warren.  She  officially  announced  her  participation  in  February  2019  in  
Lawrence, Massachusetts.  It is a symbolic location to choose in that a group of women 
started a strike at Everett Mill there in 1912: “The senator drew on the strike as a story 
of  women,  many of  them immigrants,  taking on a stacked system and triumphing 
by gaining raises, overtime and other benefits” (Taylor, 2019). That history resonates 
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with  Senator  Warren’s  political  vision  and  indirectly  underscores  the  credibility  of  
her  class-oriented  economic  agenda:  “It  won’t  be  enough  to  just  undo  the  terrible  
acts of this administration,” Ms. Warren said. “We can’t afford to just tinker around the 
edges — a tax credit here, a regulation there. Our fight is for big, structural change. 
(ibid.). Meanwhile her male opponents, observes the journalist, such as “Buttigieg and 
O’Rourke — two men with relatively thin résumés running for president — have been 
piecing together their platforms as they run” (ibid.). How does this general concern for 
woman candidates’ electability, i.e. their ability to beat Donald Trump in presidential 
office and planning to rerun for the Republicans, intersect with concerns mediated by 
popular culture? It is not that women are not considered qualified for the office at all; 
it is more like a scalar devaluation in that they are seen as ‘less’ qualified than men. 
In general, there seem to be strong doubts about the woman candidates’ capacity 
as  president  in  the  2020  elections.  When  it  comes  to  gaining  voters’  trust,  woman  
politicians have much more to overcome than men (Solnit, 2019).
Furthermore, this lesser degree of ‘electability’ is seen to be justified by being prone 
to be possessed by their ‘emotions’. For instance, in a Suffolk University poll in April 2019, 
nearly 10 percent said that if the Democratic primary elections were held today their 
primary reason for not choosing Senator Warren is because “She seems angry.”9 What 
is important to recall from social psychological research in this regard is that gender 
bias emerges in evaluative judgments of women in institutions that are distinctly seen 
as  ‘male’  in  character  even  if  the  actual  women  in  that  domain  have  successfully  
demonstrated their capacity, like Senator Warren in the Democratic Primary now. In 
those institutions, men, when angry, are not perceived as ‘out of control’ but as people 
who stand up and fight for their principles (Heilman et al., 2004). However, there is one 
important point  that seems to escape journalists’  attention even in mainstream US 
broadsheet papers when they are drawing on the various opinion polls.  They seem 
simply to take over the results without reflecting on the design of the surveys that result 
in finding gendered bias in the data. For instance, it would be important to note that 
the opinion “She seems angry” in the Suffolk University questionnaire is not provided 
by respondents to an open ended question but by the researchers – probably to test 
their expectations – but it  is even more telling to see that it  occurs in the company 
of  the option “She does not  excite  me”  with nearly  11  percent  in  agreement with it.  I  
think  it  is  reasonable  to  assume that  the meaning of  ‘exciting’  next  to  the affect  of  
anger  easily  comes  to  be  associated  with  emotions,  reiterating  and  naturalizing  
the biased gendering binary of ‘if  female then emotional’  – and therefore less likely 
to act as a reliable leader of reason – versus ‘if  male then rational’  – and therefore 
a  self-possessed  agent  deserving  trust.  The  opinion  polls  unfortunately  do  nothing  
but work hard at associating the woman candidates with the language of negative 
judgment instead of posing their question from a perspective that could cast doubt 
on the male candidates’ performance as if beyond question. In my reading, this is the 
result of the unidirectional static performance of comparison, producing masculinity 
as if proven by ‘facts’ of research. This masculinized entitlement to – or monopoly of 
–  ‘objectivity’  then  serves  to  warrant  seeing  rational  decision  as  the  exact  other  of  
affect and the very essence of presidential duty – now made ‘masculine’ without any 
need to explicitly say so. At the same time, this binary divide will evoke the allegedly 
pure affection orientation of entertainment to the point where if a woman candidate’s 
performance  is  smart,  and  she  comes  across  as  knowing  the  facts,  she  is  seen  as  
smug and all-knowing. (Solnit, 2019)
A telling and upsetting comparison in this regard may be the media perception 
of  Joe  Biden’s  performance  in  the  same  race.  When  preparing  for  his  presidential  
announcement,  Biden’s team in a preemptive move disclosed the phone call  (only 
9 For  the  study  visit  https://www.suffolk.edu/-/media/suffolk/documents/academics/
research-at-suffolk/suprc/polls/new-hampshire/2019/4_30_2019_marginals_pdf.
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after 28 years!) that he had made to Anita Hill apparently to ‘apologize’ for his conduct 
when in 1991, as the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, in the confirmation 
hearings  regarding  Hill’s  accusation  of  Clarence  Thomas,  President  George  Bush’s  
nominee to the Supreme Court, of sexual harassment, he did not support her.  Anita 
Hill  in  an  interview  about  this  phone  call  said  “she  cannot  support  Mr.  Biden  for  
president until he takes full responsibility for his conduct, including his failure to call as 
corroborating witnesses other women who were willing to testify before the Judiciary 
Committee. By leaving them out,” he said, “he created a ‘he said, she said’ situation 
that  did  not  have  to  exist.”  (Stolberg  &  Hulse,  2019).  What  is  upsetting  to  observe  is  
the successful  maintenance of  the gender politics  which prevailed in  the hearings 
back in  1991.  Despite  the current  success of  the #MeToo Campaign,  Hill’s  judgment 
that Biden failed to apologize has not put him second, behind Senator Warren in the 
Democratic race, but left her with the extra task of ‘proving herself’. 
My  point  is  not  that  man  candidates  are  not  measured  regarding  their  
‘likeability’ to the voters. However, power is not distributed equally. Likeability is read as 
‘attraction’ and defined as superficial appeal of commodity culture when linked with 
women, while men’s ‘electability’ escapes the logic of the spectacle and is evaluated 
as ‘charisma’ of innate substance, which in fact boils down to power and entitlement. 
I  think it  would be a major step forward in the US if  the press that self-identifies as 
reliable and non-biased stopped focusing their discussion of the Primary in terms of 
‘electability’,  whose mere mention at  the moment automatically  discredits  woman 
candidates. Instead, they should change the perspective of comparison to women’s 
advantage and stop confining them to ‘failure’ with a focus on what they stand for, 
if  you  wish,  for  the  masculinized  issues  of  substance   –  after  all,  their  policies  are  
much better worked out precisely because of the gender bias that requires them to 
outperform the men in the competition.10
5 Conclusion
I have studied the similarities and differences in the ways gender bias shapes 
women’s  place in  elite  politics  in  the woman MPs’  attempts  at  building an alliance 
across  the  different  opposition  factions  in  the  Hungarian  Parliament  and  in  the  
2020  Democratic  Primary  in  the  US.  The  media  perceptions  of  politicians’  activities  
in  the  two  political  arenas  share  an  exclusionary  gender  politics  that  results  in  an  
inevitable  discreditation  of  women  with  reference  to  the  measure  of  ‘authenticity’  
since  it  is  indirectly  structured  by  an  ideologically  invested  distinction  of  gender.  
The relative difference between the two spaces can be pointed out  in  the visibility  
of the legitimization of this devaluation in popular culture. In the Hungarian case, not 
only are the standards much higher for women than for men - as is also the case in 
the US Primary -,  but the value judgments are explicitly hostile and derogatory. The 
concern about the ‘electability’ of a woman politician in the US is covertly implicated 
in the concern about ‘what makes a presidential candidate likeable’; this orientation 
to  ‘affection’  triggers  a  chain  of  equivalences  about  a  bodily,  non-intellectual  
existence only when intersecting with female embodiments;  in this sense sexism is 
mobilized only  indirectly  in  the mainstream US press about  the six  candidates.  The 
understanding  of  woman  as  ‘spectacular  image’  in  Hungary  is  drawn  on  explicitly  
and in  its  extreme even with pride when women MPs are shamelessly  ridiculed for  
daring to claim entitlement to the arena of decision making of political  leadership.  
10 I mean something like Astead Herndon & Matt Flegenheimer’s opinion piece in The New 
York Times on April 21, 2019, which articulates the question of candidacy from a perspective that 
prioritizes women over the white men candidates: “Should a white man be the face of Dems in 
2020?” (https://www.realclearpolitics.com).
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They are literally reduced to soaping politics into a catwalk of fashion statements – a 
direct  move that  is  fortunately  missing from the US quality  media discourse,  but  is  
replaced by a systemic practice of confining women to failure even when trying to 
criticize the unequal gender power in favor of the man candidates. 
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